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THE FOURTH AMENDMENT EXCLUSIONARY
RULE: THE DESIRABILITY OF A GOOD
FAITH EXCEPTION
The exclusionary rule is a judicially created device designed to insure a defend-
ant'r constitutional right to befree from unreasonable searches and seizures. This
Note examines the historical development of the rule with emphasis on its underlying
rationales. The Note then examines recent Supreme Court decisions which demon-
strate a willingness to allow a goodfaith exception to the exclusionary rule. A good
faith exception would render the exclusionary rule inapplicable when a law officer
seizes evidence on an objectively reasonable goodfaith belief that the search is lawful
under thefourth amendment. The Note evaluates the argumentsfor and against the
goodfaith exception. The author concludes that the goodfaith exception strikes the
proper balance between a defendant's right to befreefrom unreasonable searches
and seizures and societys interest in assuring the safety of its members from
criminals released of the exclusionary rule windfall.
INTRODUCTION
Although the fourth amendment was ratified in 1791, its prohi-
bition against unreasonable searches and seizures remained effec-
tively dormant until the twentieth century, and its enforcement
was not notably controversial until the 1960's. The enforcement
controversy centers on the exclusionary rule-a twentieth century
judicial invention1 used as a means to enforce the fourth amend-
ment. The rule provides that upon appropriate motion by the de-
fendant in a criminal prosecution, evidence obtained from the
defendant in violation of his or her constitutional right to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures will be suppressed by or-
der of the court.'
Since the adoption of the exclusionary rule in Weeks v. United
States,3 three major rationales have been offered to justify it.4
The first justification is that the exclusionary rule is required im-
plicitly by the language of the fourth amendment, and hence is a
1. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (federal courts may not admit
evidence in violation of the fourth amendment).
2. See Marinelli, Search and Seizure: Recent Developments and the Slow Strangula-
tion of the Exclusionary Rule, 4 OHIo N.U.L. Rav. 296, 297 (1977).
3. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
4. See infra notes 23-25, 68-75 and accompanying text.
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constitutional right of the accused.5 Secondly, the rule arguably is
justified because the exclusion of illegally seized evidence is neces-
sary to preserve judicial integrity.6 Finally, the rule has been jus-
tified on the ground that it deters unlawful police conduct.7
All three rationales were evident from the inception of the ex-
clusionary rule; since then, however, they have been treated with
varying degrees of emphasis.8 Initially, the constitutional right ra-
tionale was used as the primary justification for the rule.9 Later,
the Supreme Court held that even though the fourth amendment
was binding on the states, the exclusionary rule was not, because it
could not be considered part and parcel of the fourth amend-
ment. 0 Subsequently the Court reversed itself and made the rule
binding on the states in Mapp v. Ohio."l
The Mapp decision, however, did not bind the Court to the
constitutional right theory as the only justification for the exclu-
sionary rule.' 2 Indeed, in the 1970's the Court, without overruling
Mapp unequivocally rejected the constitutional right theory as the
primary justification for the rule13 Today, the Court considers the
deterrence of police misconduct to be the primary justification for
the rule.' 4 In situations where the rule is not likely to have a de-
terrent effect, the Court has not applied it.' 5
The elevation of the deterrence rationale to primary signifi-
5. See infra note 24.
6. See infra notes 25 & 73 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 53-92 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 24-98 and accompanying text.
9. See infra note 23-24 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
11. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). See infra notes 33-44 and accompanying text.
12. On the one hand, the fapp Court refers to the fourth amendment exclusionary
rule as a "clear, specific, and constitutionally required--even if judicially implied- deter-
rent safeguard .. " 367 U.S. at 648. In contrast, the Mapp Court refers to the exclusion-
ary rule as being of "constitutional origin," id. at 649, which suggests that the rule is not so
much constitutionally required as constitutionally inspired. That is, the rule is clearly con-
stitutionally based to the extent it is used as a means to enforce the fourth amendment
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, even though there is no specific
provision for an exclusionary rule in the Constitution. Moreover, the Mapp Court referred
to the ban against unreasonable searches and seizures as a "constitutional right" and to the
exclusionary rule as a "constitutional privilege." Id. at 656. Thus, the Mapp Court ap-
peared to recognize a distinction between the right and the remedy: the purpose of the
exclusionary rule "is to deter-to compel respect for constitutional guaranty is the only
effectively available way -by removing the incentive to disregard it." Id. at 656, citing
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
13. See infra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 57-92 and accompanying text.
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cance has increased greatly the likelihood that a good faith excep-
tion to the exclusionary rule will be created. 6 Implementation of
the good faith exception would render the exclusionary rule inap-
plicable when evidence is seized based on an objectively reason-
able good faith belief that the search is lawful. 7 The proposed
exception, therefore, has both a subjective and an objective ele-
ment. For the good faith exception to be applicable, the actions of
the police officer must not only appear to be reasonable from the
standpoint of the reasonable observer, but the police officer must
have in fact been acting in good faith.
In order to determine whether a good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule is desirable, this Note begins by outlining the
history of the rule, focusing particularly on the rationales for the
rule and the foundation that has been laid for a good faith excep-
tion."8 Next, the Note examines the strengths and weaknesses of
the exclusionary rule and of the good faith exception.' 9 This ex-
amination demonstrates that the primary argument for the exclu-
sionary rule and against the good faith exception is the
constitutional right theory,20 a theory that has been rejected re-
soundingly by the present Supreme Court.2 ' After evaluating the
arguments for and against the exclusionary rule and the good
faith exception, this Note concludes that the good faith exception
represents a desirable alteration of the exclusionary rule. 22
I. BACKGROUND OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
EXCLUSIONARY RULE
A. The Early Landmark Cases
The chief reason for the adoption of the exclusionary rule in
Weeks v. United States23 appears to be that the rule can be im-
plied logically from the language of the fourth amendment and
the amendment's perceived purpose to protect individual pri-
16. See infra notes 58-92 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 23-104 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 105-46 and accompanying text.
20. See infra note 108 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 147-50 and accompanying text.
23. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). For the history of the exclusionary rule, see Katz, Reflections
on Search and Seizure and Illegally Seized Evidence in Canada and the United States, 3
CAN.-U.S. L.J. 103, 114-18 (1980); Note, Impending "Frontal Assault" on the Citadel: The
Supreme Court's Readiness to Modfy the Strict Exclusionary Rule 0/the Fourth Amendmezt
to a Good Faith Standard, 12 TULSA L.J. 337, 341-51 (1976).
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vacy.24 There were also overtones in Weeks of the argument that
courts of justice should not be tainted by using illegally seized evi-
dence to convict individuals. This concern for judicial integrity,
however, was more clearly expressed by Justices Brandeis and
Holmes years later.25 The Weeks exclusionary rule, except where
states adopted the Weeks doctrine,26 was confined solely to con-
duct involving federal officials.27
In Wolf v. Colorado,28 the Supreme Court applied its selective
incorporation policy29 and held that the fourth amendment right
to be free from arbitrary intrusions is applicable to the states
through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.30
The Court did not hold, however, that the method chosen to effec-
24. The Weeks Court stated:
The effect of the Fourth Amendment is to put the courts of the United States
and Federal officials, in the exercise of their power and authority, under limita-
tions and restraints as to the exercise of such power and authority, and to forever
secure the people, their persons, houses, papers and effects against all unreasona-
ble searches and seizures under the guise of law.
232 U.S. at 391-92. Furthermore, the Court noted,
If letters and private documents can thus be seized [in violation of the Fourth
Amendment] and held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an of-
fense, the protection of the Fourth Amendment declaring his right to be secure
against such searches and seizures is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed
are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution.
Id. at 393. See also Gilday, The Exclusionary Rule: Down and Almost Out, 4 N. Ky. L.
REV. 1, 2 (1977) (history of exclusionary rule traced through Warren and Burger Courts).
25. In his dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), Justice Holmes
said, "I think it a less evil that some criminals should escape than that the Government
should play an ignoble part." Id. at 470. In the same case, Justice Brandeis said, "If the
Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law. ... I fd. at 485 (Bran-
deis, J., dissenting).
26. By 1961, more than half of the states had adopted the exclusionary rule. Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651 (1961); Miles, The Ailing Fourth Amendment: A Suggested Cure, 63
A.B.A. J. 364, 371 (1977).
27. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 383-84.
28. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
29. Technically, Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7
Pet.) 243 (1833), contending that the states are not bound by the Bill of Rights, is still good
law. Justice Cardozo's opinion in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), expressed a
policy of selectively incorporating certain provisions of the Bill of Rights through the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Under selective incorporation the Court first
examines the relevant provision of the Bill of Rights and determines if it is "of the very
essence of a scheme of ordered liberty." Id. at 325. If it is of that "essence," then the due
process clause requires that the states be bound by that provision. Thus, the provision is
"selectively incorporated" into the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Justice
Black's view, expressed in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68-122 (1947) (Black, J.,
dissenting), that the fourteenth amendment made all of the Bill of Rights' provisions bind-
ing on the states was never adhered to by a majority of the Court. The selective incorpora-
tion approach, however, has led to virtually the same result which Justice Black desired -
today, almost all of the Bill of Rights is binding on the states.
30. 338 U.S. at 27-28.
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tuate that right-the exclusionary rule-applied to the states. In
other words, after Wo!f the states had to protect their citizens
against unreasonable searches and seizures, but they were free to
choose their own method of enforcement.3 The Court in Wof
moved away from the idea that the fourth amendment requires
the exclusionary rule, stating that it was merely "a matter of judi-
cial implication."32
B. Extended Application of the Exclusionary Rule.: Mapp v.
Ohio
Until Mapp v. Ohio33 was decided, the exclusionary rule was
not applicable to the states.34 Moreover, until shortly before the
Mapp decision, the "silver platter" doctrine severely limited the
effect of the rule on the conduct of federal officials.35 Under that
doctrine state officials could seize evidence in violation of the
fourth amendment and immediately turn it over to federal prose-
cutors on a "silver platter" for use in federal trials.36  The
Supreme Court invalidated this practice in 1960.37 Thus, before
the Mapp decision, the exclusionary rule was not controversial be-
cause of its minimal impact on criminal procedure.38
Mafpp v. Ohio made the exclusionary rule far more visible to
society because Mafpp reversed Wolf, making the exclusionary
rule binding on the states.39 Moreover, the Mapp plurality
opinion4° reverted to the constitutional justification for the rule 4 '
31. Justice Frankfurter wrote in Wolf.
Granting that in practice the exclusion of evidence may be an effective way of
deterring unreasonable searches, it is not for this Court to condemn as falling
below the minimal standards assured by the Due Process Clause a State's reliance
upon other methods which, if consistently enforced, would be equally effective.
Id. at 31.
32. Id. at 28.
33. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
34. Wof, 338 U.S. at 31.
35. Note, supra note 23, at 345-46.
36. See, e.g., Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487 (1944); Byars v. United States,
273 U.S. 28 (1927).
37. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
38. In contrast, since Mapp, "the exclusionary rule has enjoyed a less than tranquil
existence." Note, The Proposed Good Faith Test for Fourth Amendment Exclusion Com-
pared to the § 1983 GoodFaith Defense." Problems andProspects, 20 ARIZ. L. REv. 915, 920
(1978).
39. 367 U.S. at 643-60.
40. Justice Clark wrote the opinion of the Court. Justices Black and Douglas each
wrote a separate concurring opinion. Justices Harlan, Frankfurter, and Whittaker dis-
sented. Justice Stewart did not express a view as to the merits of the exclusionary rule
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holding that it is "an essential part of the right to privacy"4 2 pro-
tected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The reason why the rule is an essential part of that right, however,
has never been made clear,43 and with increasing frequency indi-
vidual Justices have come to characterize the rule as simply a mat-
ter of remedial detail.'
The question of whether the fourth amendment requires the
exclusionary rule is a matter of constitutional interpretation that
carries with it difficulties central to all constitutional adjudica-
tions. The Constitution does not mention an exclusionary rule,
but extremely expansive terms such as due process leave signifi-
cant room for varying interpretations.45 Thus, whether the rule is
constitutionally required only can be determined by looking to
standards and values outside the text of the Constitution. 6 The
present Supreme Court weighed these standards and values and
decided that the fourth amendment does not of necessity require
the exclusionary rule.47
C. Limiting the Exclusionary Rule:
The Approach of the Burger Court
The Supreme Court rejected the proposition that the exclu-
sionary rule is constitutionally required in United States v. Calan-
dra.48 In Calandra, evidence was seized from a place of business
in a search that extended beyond the scope of the search war-
rant.49 Subsequently, the owner of the business, Calandra, was
subpoenaed by a grand jury and questioned about the seized evi-
issue; rather, he voted to reverse the state conviction because he believed the statute under
which the defendant was convicted was unconstitutional. Id. at 672.
41. See 367 U.S. at 655-59; Monaghan, Forward- Constitutional Common Law, 89
HARV. L. RaV. 1, 3 (1975).
42. 367 U.S. at 656.
43. Monaghan, supra note 41.
44. See, e.g., United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975); United States v. Calandra,
414 U.S. 338 (1974).
45. See, e.g., Kamisar, Is the Exclusionary Rule an "Illogical" or "Unnatural" Interpre-
tation of the Fourth Amendment?, 62 JUDICATURE 66 (1978); Schrock & Welsh, Up from
Calandra: The Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional Requirement, 59 MINN. L. REV. 251
(1974).
46. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 385
(1798).
47. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-48 (1974).
48. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
49. Id. at 338.
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dence. Calandra refused to answer the inquiries.5 0 The Court,
however, held that a witness before a grand jury may not refuse to
answer questions about evidence obtained during an unlawful
search." In refusing to apply the exclusionary rule, the Court
stated that the exclusionary rule "is a judicially created remedy
designed to safeguard fourth amendment rights generally through
its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of
the party aggrieved."52
Calandra calls attention to the third justificiation for the exclu-
sionary rule-to deter police from making illegal searches to ob-
tain evidence. The deterrence rationale was recognized before
Calandra,53 but the significance of this case in shaping subsequent
judicial development of the exclusionary rule cannot be over-
stated. 4 The Mapp assumption 55-that the Constitution requires
the rule-is no longer legally valid, because Calandra states that
deterrence is the primary rationale for the rule.
56
The Court has continued to follow the Calandra decision.
5 7
Thus, if no deterrent effect is likely to be gained by excluding evi-
dence in a particular case, the evidence should be admitted. The
argument for a good faith exception, then, says that since law of-
ficers cannot be deterred if they are acting on a good faith belief
that a wrongful search is legal, exclusion of evidence obtained in
the search is unnecessary and unwise.
Michigan v. Tucker,58 a fifth amendment case, was the first
Supreme Court decision to recognize a relationship between the
deterrence rationale for the exclusionary rule and a possible good
faith exception to the rule.5 9 The Tucker case 60 involved a rape
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 348. This statement has been repeated on several occasions. See, e.g.,
Peltier, 422 U.S. at 538; Ball, Good Faith and the Fourth Amendment: The 'Reasonable"
Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 69 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY, 635, 650 (1978);
Monaghan, supra note 41, at 4.
53. The Mapp decision recognized and emphasized the deterrence rationale. 367 U.S.
at 656.
54. See Ball, supra note 52, at 650; Monaghan, supra note 41, at 4 (calling Calandra a
"watershed").
55. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
56. See 414 U.S. at 347.
57. See infra notes 58-101 and accompanying text.
58. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
59. Ball, supra note 52, at 651.
60. 417 U.S. at 435. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), held that the fifth
amendment requires suspects to be informed of their privilege against self-incrimination
before any statements made by them may be used againstthem in a judicial proceeding.
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suspect who was questioned before the Miranda decision and to
whom, therefore, the full Miranda warnings were not given. The
questioning of the suspect led the police to a friend of the accused
who produced incriminating evidence.6' The issue presented was
whether the evidence should be excluded by applying Miranda
retroactively.62 The Court did not exclude the evidence and stated
that before it would penalize the police by suppressing evidence, it
would consider whether exclusion would deter the deprivation of
an accused's constitutional rights.63 Justice Rehnquist, writing for
the majority, stated that "[w]here the official action was pursued
in complete good faith. . . the deterrence rationale loses much of
its force."64
Recognizing a good faith exception to the application of the
fifth amendment exclusionary rule was not the only basis for the
decision in the Tucker case.65 Other bases included the voluntari-
ness of the accused's statement and the reliability of the evidence
obtained as a result of that statement.6 6 Moreover, Justice Bren-
nan stated in his concurring opinion that the decision could have
been based upon retroactivity grounds. 67 Regardless of these alter-
native rationales for the Tucker holding, the case showed the
Court's willingness to look at the nature of the violation of the
accused's rights before excluding the illegally obtained evidence.
In Peltier v. United States,68 the Court found that a good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule hinders neither the deterrence
nor the judicial integrity rationales for the rule.69 Peltier involved
the seizure of marijuana in an automobile search less than one
hundred miles from the Mexican border.7" The search occurred
four months before the Court in Almeida-Sanchez v. United
The analogy between the fourth and fifth amendment exclusionary rules should not be
carried to an extreme. The fifth amendment words "nor shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself," U.S. CoNsT. amend. V, give the fifth amendment
exclusionary rule a stronger basis in the language of the Constitution. Still, the analogy is
valuable because the Miranda warning is a judicial invention used to deter law officers
from violating an accused's fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
61. 417 U.S. at 436.
62. Id. at 435.
63. Id. at 446.
64. Id. at 447.
65. Ball, supra note 52, at 651.
66. 417 U.S. at 444-45, 448-49.
67. Id. at 453-59 (Brennan, J., concurring).
68. 422 U.S. 531 (1975).
69. Id. at 535-38, 542; see Ball, supra note 52, at 652.
70. 422 U.S. at 532.
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States7 declared similar searches unconstitutional. In Peltier the
Court held that Almeida-Sanchez would not be applied retroac-
tively because the searching agents relied on a judicially approved
federal statute.72 Justice Rehnquist wrote for the majority that
"'judicial integrity' is. .. not offended if law enforcement offi-
cials reasonably believed in good faith that their conduct was in
accordance with the law. . . "I' even if their conduct is later de-
clared "to be unconstitutional.74 With respect to the deterrence ra-
tionale, Justice Rehnquist stated:
If the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful po-
lice conduct then evidence obtained from a search should be
suppressed onlyfit can be said that the law enforcement officer
had knowledge, or may properly be charged with knowledge,
that the search was unconstitutional under the Fourth
Amendment.75
Thus, the Court has expressed a reluctance to exclude evidence
under the fourth amendment, and in some cases the fifth amend-
ment, unless the unlawful police conduct is willful or at least
negligent.76
In Brown v. Illinois,77 another Miranda case, Justice Powell, in
a concurring opinion joined by Justice Rehnquist, stated that a
good faith violation of an accused's constitutional rights is to be
determined by using a sliding scale approach. At one end of the
scale is the flagrantly abusive violation and at the other end is the
technical violation.78  For flagrantly abusive violations, such as
pretext arrests and blatant, unnecessary personal privacy intru-
sions, the exclusion of evidence is needed for both deterence and
judicial integrity reasons.79 Technical violations, such as arrests
based in good faith reliance on a warrant later held to be invalid
or based on a statute later declared unconstitutional, 0 do not re-
quire the exclusion of evidence because neither the deterrence nor
the judicial integrity goals of the exclusionary rule are furthered.81
71. 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
72. 422 U.S. at 531. The statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3) (1976), had allowed searches
for illegally entering aliens within a specified number of miles from a United States border.
73. 422 U.S. at 538 (emphasis supplied).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 542 (emphasis added).
76. Ball, supra note 52, at 652.
77. 422 U.S. 590 (1975).
78. Ball, supra note 52, at 652.
79. 422 U.S. at 611 (Powell, J., concurring in part). See Peltier, 422 U.S. at 535-38;
Tucker, 417 U.S. at 450 n.25.
80. 422 U.S. at 611.
81. Id. at 612.
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Justice Powell did not attempt to categorize the numerous situa-
tions that fall between the two extremes on his scale, but he did
stress that the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule should be
kept "sharply in focus"'82 in dealing with the "in between" cases.
The Court in Stone v. Powell8 3 further narrowed the applica-
bility of the fourth amendment exclusionary rule in deciding that
fourth amendment claims may not be raised in federal habeas
corpus attacks upon convictions where the state has provided an
opportunity for "full and fair" litigation of the claim.84 Although
Powell did not use a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule
as the basis for its decision, Chief Justice Burger expressed his
support for a good faith exception in his concurring opinion. He
reasoned that a good faith exception is desirable because the cost
of exclusion to society is too great when no deterrent effect is
shown. 85 Moreover, he referred to the rule as a "Draconian, dis-
credited device in its present absolutist form."8 6
Justice White disagreed with the Court's holding in Powell,
but his dissent significantly contributed to the development of a
good faith exception.87 Justice White proposed that a good faith
exception should arise when an officer makes a good faith mistake
concerning the existence of probable cause.88 Justice White stated
that an officer must have both a good faith belief that his or her
conduct was in accordance with the law and reasonable grounds
for that belief.89 In Justice White's view, the deterrence rationale
of the exclusionary rule would not be served in cases involving a
good faith mistake as to probable cause. 9°
The Court in United States v. Janis9 imposed another consid-
erable limitation on the exclusionary rule by holding that it should
not bar the use of evidence illegally seized by a criminal law of-
ficer of one sovereign, in a civil proceeding of another sovereign. 92
82. Id.
83. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
84. Id. at 481-82.
85. Id. at 499-500 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
86. Id. at 500. Actually, the Chief Justice would prefer either to completely eliminate
the exclusionary rule or limit its application to cases of extreme bad faith conduct. Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 412-24 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting);
Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchman?, 14 AM. U.L. REV. 1 (1964).
87. See Ball, supra note 52, at 653.
88. 428 U.S. at 538-39 (White, J., dissenting).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 539-40.
91. 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
92. In Janis, a judge issued a search warrant based on a police officer's affidavit. The
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The Court was not overruling a past decision, but merely prevent-
ing a result which the broadness of Mapp would have allowed. In
reaching its decision the Court in Janis, like the Court in Powell,
applied a balancing test to determine whether the rule's deterrence
of police conduct outweighed the cost to society inflicted by its
application.
D. Recent Decisions Continue to Limit the Scope of the
Exclusionary Rule
In more recent cases the Court has continued to limit the ap-
plicability of the exclusionary rule, which indicates that the pres-
ent Court is receptive to the creation of a good faith exception. In
United States v. Ceccolini,93 the Court balanced the exclusionary
rule's benefits against its costs and decided that the rule should be
applied with reluctance where the constitutional violation leads to
the discovery of a witness rather than inanimate evidence.94
Moreover, the Court held in Rakas v. Illinois95 that fourth amend-
ment rights may not be vicariously asserted by a person incrimi-
nated as a result of an illegal search and seizure of a third person's
premises or property.96 Furthermore, in United States v. Cace-
res,97 the Court held that evidence obtained in violation of Inter-
nal Revenue Service (IRS) regulations could be admitted at the
police seized cash and certain wagering records from Janis' premises pursuant to the war-
rant. A trial court later found the affidavit defective, and granted a motion to quash the
warrant and return the seized records to Janis. Janis filed suit to recover the cash. The
district court and the court of appeals concluded that Janis was entitled to a refund because
the cash was obtained in an illegal search. The Supreme Court reversed, because the deter-
rence value of returning the cash was too slight to justify the refund. Id. at 433-60.
93. 435 U.S. 268 (1978).
94. A police officer observed an envelope with money in it on the cash register in
Ceccolini's flower shop. The officer examined the envelope and found money and policy
slips in iL An employee of the shop was asked to whom the envelope belonged and she
answered that it belonged to Ceccolini. The employee testified against Ceccolini at his
trial. The Court held that the relationship between the illegal search of the envelope and
the employee's testimony was too tenuous to require exclusion of that testimony. Id. at
279-80.
95. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
96. In Jakas, the police stopped a suspected getaway car after receiving a robbery
report. Rakas and the other petitioners were passengers in the car. The police found a box
of rifle shells and a sawed-off rifle in the car. The petitioners were convicted of armed
robbery at a trial in which the rifle and shells were admitted as evidence. The Court held
that the petitioner's motion to exclude the rifle and shells on fourth amendment grounds
should be overruled because the car, as well as the rifle and shells, did not belong to the
petitioners. Id. at 133-38. For a discussion of Rakas, see Note, Standing Up for Fourth
Amendment Rights: Salucci, Rawlings, and the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy, 31
CASE W. Ras. L. REv. 656, 668-75 (1981).
97. 440 U.S. 741 (1979).
1982]
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criminal trial of a taxpayer accused of bribing an IRS agent.98
The Caceres case is particularly significant because the major-
ity mentioned the good faith rationale: "The agency action, while
later found to be in violation of the regulations, nonetheless re-
flected a reasonable, good-faith attempt to comply in a situation in
which no one questions that monitoring was appropriate. .. .
Caceres is the first case in which Justice Stevens, writing for the
majority, has applied the good faith rationale. Despite the fact
that the good faith statement is limited in scope and is dictum, it
may indicate that Justice Stevens is inclined to accept a good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule.10 Such a tendency is impor-
tant because previous cases indicate that at least four other Jus-
tices support a good faith exception to the fourth amendment
exclusionary rule-Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Powell,
Rehnquist, and White.' 10
Even more recently, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
concluded in United States v. Williams °2 that the exclusionary
sanction may no longer be used to suppress evidence that is dis-
covered by law officers acting in good faith and under the objec-
tively reasonable, though mistaken, belief that their actions are
authorized. The Williams exception for reasonable good faith
mistakes is analogous to the good faith exception mentioned by
Justice White in Stone v. Powell.03 Unfortunately, however, the
good faith exception was only an alternative holding in Williams
and it is, therefore, effectively insulated from Supreme Court
review.1°4
98. Id. at 749-57. Caceres involved IRS regulations which prohibit "consensual elec-
tronic surveillance," id. at 744, between taxpayers and IRS agents unless certain specified
prior authorization is obtained. The Justice Department had not granted authority for the
meetings with Caceres. At the meetings, respondent Caceres, unaware of the surveillance,
paid or offered money to the agent for a favorable resolution of the audit. Caceres was later
prosecuted for bribing an IRS agent. The Court held that there was no need to exclude the
tape recordings because the exclusionary rule does not apply to IRS actions. Id. at 749-52.
For a discussion of Caceres, see Note, Exclusionary Rule - Recordings Obtained in Viola-
lion of IRS Manual Procedures Admissible in Subsequent Criminal Trial, 85 DICK. L. REv.
183 (1980).
99. 440 U.S. at 757 (emphasis added).
100. Note, supra note 98, at 189-90.
101. See supra notes 48-104 and accompanying text.
102. United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127
(1981).
103. See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
104. Judge Rubin, in his concurring opinion, wrote:
The announcement of the rule as an alternative ground for decision in a case
where all the court agrees on the result virtually immunizes this case from
Supreme Court review. We must, therefore, await another case where the issue is
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II. A CRITIQUE OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE AND THE GOOD
FAITH EXCEPTION
A. The Lurking Constitutional Question
One of the strongest arguments against the exclusionary rule is
that it excludes valid, irrefutable evidence from the judicial
factfinding process.I10 For this reason and others, Judge Malcolm
Richard Wilkey'06 believes that the exclusionary rule based on
fourth amendment grounds should be abolished.10 7 Professor
Yale Kamisar, however, believes that the rule should remain fully
intact as an indispensable means of enforcing an individual's con-
stitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures, notwithstanding the fact that the rule by its very defini-
tion excludes probative evidence. 108 The good faith exception is a
compromise between these two positions. Rather than abolishing
the rule completely, its application would be limited to these situa-
tions where law officersfail to base their searches on a good faith,
objectively reasonable belief that their actions do not violate the
fourth amendment.
The fundamental difference between the Wilkey and Kamisar
views lies in their interpretation of the Constitution.10 9 Professor
Kamisar maintains that the fourth amendment requires the exclu-
sionary rule by implication. °10 In contrast, Judge Wilkey is cor-
rect in pointing out that the Supreme Court, the final interpreter
of the Constitution,"' has never clearly held that the exclusionary
rule is required constitutionally by the fourth amendment. Five
Justices in Mapp v. Ohio did suggest a constitutional basis for the
rule, but Justice Black did not see the fourth amendment alone as
directly raised and decide the question again before... the Supreme Court will
review what we do.
622 F.2d at 851.
105. Wilkey, The Exclusionary Rule: WPhy Suppress Valid Evidence?, 62 JUDICATURE
214, 220-21 (1978).
106. Judge Malcolm Richard Wilkey of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit is well-known as a staunch opponent of the exclusionary rule.
107. Wilkey, supra note 105, at 232.
108. Kamisar, Is the Exclusionary Rule an "Illegal" or "Unnatural"Interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment?, 62 JUDICATURE 66, 84 (1978).
109. For further debate between the two commentators see Kamisar, The Exclusionary
Rule in Historical Perspective: The Struggle to Make the Fourth Amendment More than 'An
Empty Blessing,' 62 JUDICATURE 337 (1979); Wilkey, A Callfor Alternatives to the Exclu-
sionary Rule: Let Congress and the Trial Courts Speak, 62 JUDICATURE 351 (1979).
110. See Kamisar, supra note 108, at 83-84.
111. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137 (1803)).
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providing adequate support for the rule.1 12 A strong majority of
the Court, therefore, has not agreed upon the constitutional basis
for the exclusionary rule.
It is neither accurate nor realistic to state that the Court has
relied on any single rationale for the exclusionary rule. Instead,
the history of the rule indicates that the Court has placed varying
degrees of emphasis on three rationales." 13 In light of this incon-
sistent history, Professor Kamisar's belief that the exclusionary
rule is constitutionally required because of the Supreme Court
holdings in Weeks and Mapp is not soundly supported. Indeed,
the possible support Weeks and Mapp gave to the constitutional
rationale was clearly undercut by the Court's statements in Calan-
dra concerning the deterrence rationale." 4 In sum, it is more ap-
propriate to say that the exclusionary rule is constitutionally
inspired rather than constitutionally required.
B. Protection of Constitutional Values
Assuming that the exclusionary rule is a reflection of constitu-
tional values rather than a constitutional absolute in itself, it must
be determined whether a good faith exception would adequately
protect the constitutional values involved. The exclusionary rule
was created as a means to enforce the fourth amendment prohibi-
tion of unreasonable searches and seizuresll"-a prohibition that
protects the highly valued right to personal privacy." 6 The con-
stitutional value which must be guarded, then, is the desire to be
free from unwarranted intrusions. It is not the purpose of the
fourth amendment to exclude probative evidence from the judicial
factfinding process. The exclusion of evidence is not a constitu-
tional end in itself. The exclusionary rule is only a means to safe-
guard constitutionally valued personal privacy. Since the
exclusionary rule is a means of enforcing a constitutional provi-
112. See supra note 40-41 and accompanying text.
113. See Gilday, supra note 24, at 2-4; Wilkey, supra note 105, at 220.
114. The Court stated that the exclusionary rule "is a judicially created remedy
designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect
rather than a constitutional right of the party aggrieved." Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348.
115. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
116. See, e.g, United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975); Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967). For further discussion of the fourth amend-
ment's underpinnings, see N. LASSON, THE HISTORY OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT (1970);
Note, The Historical and Philosophical Foundations of the Exclusionary Rule, 12 TULSA LJ.
323, 332-33 (1976).
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sion, its effectiveness should be compared with other possible
means, including the good faith exception.
Judge Wilkey discusses several possible ramifications of the
exclusionary rule" 7 one of which is the high crime rate. 1 8 A
number of factors, however, are responsible for the nation's dis-
tressing crime problem1 9 and Judge Wilkey is undoubtedly exag-
gerating the impact of the exclusionary rule. On the other hand,
freeing guilty individuals for lack of evidence, when the best evi-
dence has been excluded, certainly does not discourage the com-
mission of crimes. Assuming that the exclusionary rule is one
contributing factor to the high crime rate, a good faith exception
would limit the applicability of the rule and decrease the number
of criminals freed.
Judge Wilkey also maintains that the rule needlessly frustrates
police and prosecutors in their attempts to capture and convict
criminals.' 20
This frustration is not needless, however, when constitutional
values are at stake.'' Arguably, though, it may be needless in
situations where police act on the reasonable, good faith belief
that their conduct conforms to fourth amendment standards.
Judge Wilkey further argues that the exclusionary rule distorts
117. See Wilkey, supra note 105, at 215-16, 220-27. For discussions of the exclusion-
ary rule's effect, see Burns, Mapp v. Ohio: An All-American Mistake, 19 DE PAUL L. REV.
80, 92-94 (1969); Murphy, The Problem of Compliance by Police Departments, 44 TEX. L.
REv. 939, 942-46 (1966); Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U.
CHI. L. REV. 665, 736-39 (1970).
118. See UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REP. (March 31, 1981)
"The number of Crime Index offenses reported to law enforcement agencies rose 10 per-
cent from 1979 to 1980 according to preliminary annual figures."
119. See R. CLARK, CRIME IN AMERICA 56-67 (1970): "Poverty, illness, injustice, idle-
ness, ignorance, human misery and crime go together.... We cultivate crime, breed it,
nourish it." Id. at 66.; J. MICHAEL & M. ADLER, CRIME, LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE
106-69 (1971) (discusses: physical traits, intelligence, character, domestic or familial fac-
tors, economic factors, alcoholism, and drug addiction and their relationship to crime);
Menninger, The Roots of Urban Crime,'A Psychodynamic Perspective, in CRIME IN URBAN
SOCIETY 3 (McLennan ed. 1970) (personality and environment as crime-producing factors).
120. See Wilkey, supra note 105, at 218.
121. Justice Jackson wrote in West Virginia Bd. ofEduc. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638
(1943), "The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the
vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and offi-
cials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts." The fourth
amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures, and popular sentiment should
not be allowed to overrule that prohibition. The question, however, is whether the fourth
amendment should be read as requiring the exclusionary rule as the means of enforcing the
prohibition against unreasonable searches. This Note maintains that the exclusionary rule
is not constitutionally mandated and could theoretically be replaced without offending the
Constitution.
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the truth, 122 fails to recognize different levels of culpability of the
officer or degrees of harm to the victim, 123 discourages the police
from disciplining themselves, 124 and does not allow the states to
experiment with other methods of controlling police conduct and
protecting individual privacy.125  A good faith exception would
help alleviate some of these problems. For example, a good faith
exception would reduce the instances where truth is suppressed
because evidence seized by a police officer acting in good faith
would not be excluded. In addition, the exception would allow for
the recognition of varying degrees of police culpability by not ex-
cluding evidence when the officer was less culpable, that is, when
the officer acted in good faith.
Finally, Judge Wilkey argues that neither the judicial integrity
nor the deterrence rationales are served by the exclusionary
rule.126 Concerning judicial integrity, he states that the exclusion
of good evidence "undermines the reputation of and destroys the
respect for the entire judicial system."' 127 It is indeed difficult to
maintain that courts improve their reputation by freeing criminals
when probative, reliable, and incriminating evidence is available.
On the other hand, blatant personal intrusions like pumping a
person's stomach, 28 or the thorough ransacking of a private
122. Wilkey, supra note 105, at 222. Wilkey maintains that the exclusionary rule dis-
torts the truth because it excludes "undeniable facts" and, therefore, prevents the truth
from being known to the greatest extent possible.
123. Id. at 225-26. Wilkey explains: "It does not matter whether the action of the
officer was grossly willful and flagrant or whether he was conscientiously using his very
best judgment under difficult circumstances; the result is the same: the evidence is out."
Id. at 226.
124. Id. at 226. Wilkey reasons:
Even if police officials know that an officer violated Fourth Amendment stan-
dards in a particular case, few of them will charge the erring officer with a Fourth
Amendment violation: it would sabotage the case for the prosecution before it
even begins. The prosecutor hopes the defendant will plea bargain and thus re-
ceive some punishment, even if the full rigor of the law cannot be imposed be-
cause of the dubious validity of the search. Even after the defendant has been
convicted or has pleaded guilty, it would be dangerous to discipline the of-
ficer-months or years later-because the offender might come back seeking one
of the now popular post conviction remedies. Id. at 226-27.
125. Id. at 227. The Mapp decision imposed the exclusionary rule on the states. Conse-
quently, the states are not free to try other means to remedy illegal searches and seizures.
126. Id. at 220, 223.
127. Id. at 223.
128. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). Rochin involved the conduct of
three police officers who suspected that Rochin was selling narcotics, and without probable
cause entered his home and forced their way into his bedroom. Upon the officer's arrival,
Rochin swallowed two capsules of an unknown substance. After first unsuccessfully trying
to extract the capsules by force, the officers took Rochin to a hospital where an emetic
solution was forced into his stomach. The resulting morphine capsules were used to con-
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home, 29 weaken Judge Wilkey's position, since judicial integrity
is likely to be tainted when incriminating evidence is obtained in a
manner that "shocks the conscience."13 Thus, judicial integrity
suffers both when an accused murderer is freed because of a tech-
nicality and when an accused's conviction is obtained by a serious
privacy intrusion.
A good faith exception would help to solve this judicial integ-
rity dilemma. Assuming police are more likely to commit minor
fourth amendment violations when they are acting in good
faith,13 1 the judicial integrity rationale would be served by a good
faith exception because fewer dangerous criminals would be re-
leased as a result of relatively minor police misconduct. More-
over, in those cases where the police were not acting in good faith,
judicial integrity would be served because the good faith excep-
tion would not apply and the evidence obtained would be ex-
cluded. Addressing the deterrence rationale for the exclusionary
rule, Judge Wilkey argues that the exclusion of evidence does
nothing to punish and deter police, but instead it provides a wind-
fall for criminals.132 In empirical studies, social scientists Bradley
Canon and Steven R. Schlesinger attempted to determine whether
vict Rochin of a drug possession charge. The Supreme Court reversed on the grounds that
the evidence was obtained in violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Id. at 174. It is noteworthy that Rochin was decided before Mapp explicitly incorpo-
rated the fourth amendment exclusionary rule into the due process clause and thereby
made it binding on the states.
129. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Mapp questioned the conduct of three
police officers who entered Mapp's home forcibly without a valid warrant. The officers
thoroughly searched the entire premises- drawers, closets, suitcases-until they finally
discovered some pornographic material in a basement trunk. Mapp was subsequently con-
victed of possession of obscene material. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that all
evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the fourth amendment is inad-
missible in a state criminal proceeding.
130. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172.
131. Justice Brennan, however, fears that the police will commit minor fourth amend-
ment infractions in badath because they know they are likely to get away with it. Peltier,
422 U.S. at 559 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The good faith exception would require both
actual good faith and objective reasonableness. The question of actual good faith would be
left for the trier of fact. Justice Brennan is apparently worried that the reasonableness test
and the question of actual good faith will become inextricably intertwined-and that a
reasonableness test for probable cause will be reestablished. Ball, supra note 52, at 154.
See Note, Moving to Suppress the ExclusionaryiRule: The Use of Illegally Obtained Evidence
as the Basis/or Probable Cause, 60 B.U.L. REv. 713 (1980) (discussion of the relationship
of probable cause to the exclusionary rule). Despite Brennan's concerns, it is no more
difficult for a court to reach a proper conclusion as to whether there was actual good faith
in a particular case, than it is for a court to answer other difficult questions that must be
faced regularly.
132. Wilkey, supra note 105, at 223.
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the exclusion of evidence does in fact deter police.1 33 Professor
Canon concluded that the exclusionary rule "has a differential im-
pact depending upon time and place."1 34 Professor Schlesinger,
however, confidently asserted that the rule is an ineffective deter-
rent. 1 35 Considering that the Supreme Court now considers deter-
rence to be the primary justification for the rule, 136 Professor
Schlesinger's conclusion seems to indicate that the exclusionary
rule should be abandoned.
Regardless of the deterrence rationale's effect on the exclusion-
ary rule, the strength of the deterrence rationale is irrelevant to the
question of the propriety of a good faith exception. In fact, even if
it could be shown that the exclusionary rule is overwhelmingly
effective as a deterrent, the desirability of a good faith exception
would not be affected. A police officer cannot be deterred from
violating fourth amendment rights while believing in reasonable
good faith that those rights are not being violated. Thus, a good
faith exception is compatible with the Supreme Court's primary
rationale for the exclusionary rule--deterrence of police
misconduct. 137
III. DOUBTS ABOUT A GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION
There are two major criticisms of the good faith exception:
first, that the exception will lead to the destruction of the exclu-
sionary rule; and second, that law enforcers might take less care to
respect the constitutional rights of suspects.13 The good faith ex-
ception, however, would not lead necessarily to the destruction of
the exclusionary rule. Its objective is not to eradicate the rule, but
rather to prevent its application when the police have acted in rea-
133. Schlesinger, The Exclusionary Rule: Have Proponents Proven that It Is a Deterrent
to Police?, 62 JUDICATURE 404 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Schlesinger, The Exclusionary
Rule]; Canon, The Exclusionary Rule: Have Critics Proven that it Doesn't Deter Police?, 62
JUDICATURE 398 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Canon, The Exclusionary Rule].
For their responses to each other's studies see Schlesinger, A Reply to Professor Canon,
62 JUDICATURE 457 (1979); Canon, A Postscrot on Empirical Studies and the Exclusionary
Rule, 62 JUDICATURE 455 (1979).
134. Canon, The Exclusionary Rule, supra note 133, at 400. Professor Cannon suggests
that the rule may be a more effective deterrent today than it was in the first few years after
Mapp. Id. at 401. Professor Canon bases this belief on his own study, the results of which
are reported in Canon, Is the Exclusionary Rule in Failing Health? Some New Data and a
Plea Against a Prec#itous Conclusion, 62 Ky. L.J. 681 (1974).
135. Schlesinger, The Exclusionary Rule, supra note 133, at 405.
136. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 48-103 and accompanying text.
138. Peltier, 422 U.S. at 551, 554 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Ball, supra note 52, at 655.
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sonable good faith. Certain Justices on the Supreme Court have
expressed a desire to abolish the rule, 139 but the constitutional un-
derpinning is such that total obliteration is unlikely.
The concern about law enforcers who ignore the rights of sus-
pects relates to the deterrence effect of the exclusionary rule.
140
Judge Wilkey argues that the rule does nothing to "punish" police
officers, that it only hinders the work of prosecutors and frees
criminals. 141 On the other hand, as Justice Brennan pointed out in
Peltier,142 the rule may have a broader deterrent purpose-a gen-
eral "educative" effect.1 43 This educative effect could enhance po-
lice morale and cause police to have greater respect for individual
rights. In any event, the good faith exception should not hinder
the positive effects Justice Brennan believes the rule could have,
because police officers acting on a good faith belief that their con-
duct is lawful are not deterred by the exclusionary rule.
Nevertheless, Justice Brennan fears that when police are
forced to make on-the-spot decisions about the existence of prob-
able cause,'" they will be tempted to search and seize simply be-
cause they believe their actions will appear objectively
reasonable.' 45 Justice Brennan, however, is merely calling atten-
tion to a difficulty with the reasonable person standard, which the
139. See supra note 101 and accompanying text. In California v. Minjares, 444 U.S.
887 (1979), Justice Rehnquist joined Chief Justice Burger's campaign against the exclusion-
ary rule.
140. See supra note 133.
141. Wilkey, supra note 105, at 218. Dean Wigmore presented the following scenario
to illustrate the result of the exclusionary rule:
Titus, you have been found guilty of conducting a lottery; Flavius, you have con-
fessedly violated the Constitution. Titus ought to suffer imprisonment for crime,
and Flavius for contempt. But no! We shall let you both go free. We shall not
punish Flavius directly, but shall do so by reversing Titus' coviction. This is our
way of teaching people like Titus to behave, and incidently of securing respect for
the Constitution. Our way of upholding the Constitution is not to strike at the
man who breaks it, but to let off somebody else who broke something else.
Wigmore, Using Evidence Obtained by Illegal Search and Seizure, 8 A.B.A.J. 479, 484
(1922).
142. 422 U.S. 531 (1975).
143. Id. at 555 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
144. See, e.g., United States v. Montgomery, 561 F.2d 875 (D.C. Cir. 1977), discussed in
Wilkey, supra note 105, at 218-19. In Montgomery, two police officers saw Montgomery
driving his car in a way that suggested he was "sizing up" the neighborhood. After the
police had stopped Montgomery, they learned that an arrest warrant was outstanding
against him. The officers searched him and found two guns and ammunition. The court of
appeals later reversed Montgomery's conviction for possession of firearms, by holding that
no probable cause existed for the arrest in the first place, and that all of the evidence
discovered thereafter was the product of an illegal search and seizure.
145. 422 U.S. at 560-61 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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courts have had experience applying in tort cases. Under the good
faith exception, the court first determines if the officer's conduct
was objectively reasonable- the reasonable person standard. The
court then determines if the act actually was performed in good
faith. This subjective determination merely requires an answer to
a question of fact; something which courts and juries do every
day. If this straightforward test is applied, it is unlikely that many
police officers will be able to abuse the good faith exception. '46
IV. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, the decision of whether to implement a good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule should be reached only after
balancing the constitutional value of privacy with our society's se-
rious crime problem. The exclusionary rule was created as a
means of enforcing the fourth amendment, but that does not mean
it should be accepted unquestionably as part and parcel of that
amendment. Constitutional rights are dearly purchased when the
price paid is that guilty criminals are set free. As Chief Justice
Burger recently stated, echoing Justice Jackson, the Constitution is
not intended to be a "suicide pact."'14'  The good faith exception
may well strike the best possible balance.
In a society with an alarmingly high crime rate, the good faith
exception would considerably lessen the number of criminals who
are set free as a result of the exclusionary rule windfall.' 48 At the
same time, with a good faith exception the exclusionary rule re-
mains intact, preventing evidence from being used which is ob-
tained in an unreasonable manner. 49 When the appropriate case
comes before it, the Supreme Court should follow the lead of the
Fifth Circuit and create a good faith exception to the exclusionary
rule.' 50 The good faith exception appears to be in the best inter-
ests of society and the Constitution.
DONALD L. WILLITS
146. It is true that the good faith exception would allow some officers to illegally search
in bad faith because their actions appear objectively reasonable. The possibility of abuse,
however, is outweighed by the costs of the exclusionary rule. See supra notes 55-119 and
accompanying text.
147. Burger, Annual Report to the American Bar Association by the Chief Justice of the
United States, 67 A.B.A.J. 290 (1981).
148. See Wilkey, supra note 105, at 223.
149. See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
150. See supra note 102 and accompanying text. Currently, a bill is pending in the
Senate which would legislatively supersede Mapp. S. 101, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
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